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VIRGINIA'S ACQUISITION OF UNCLAIMED AND
ABANDONED PERSONAL PROPERTY
The concept of "escheat," under which the state acquires an in-
terest in unclaimed property,1 originated as an inseparable inci-
dent of the feudal tenure system in medieval England. Under the
feudal system, the king granted estates in land to the lords, who in
turn granted portions to freeholding tenants. If a tenant died with-
out heirs to continue the service that the lord demanded in return
for granting the land, the estate would "escheat" to the lord, and
the lord could grant it to another tenant. If a lord died without
heirs, his estate similarly escheated to the Crown. 2 In this way, es-
cheat perpetuated the tenure system. It also ensured, among other
things, the continuing flow of revenue to the Crown.
The importance that the Crown placed on the escheat of realty
in medieval times, however, contrasted with its treatment of un-
claimed personal property. The Crown largely ignored personalty
as a source of revenue. Because relatively little wealth in feudal
England consisted of personal property, this treatment is not sur-
prising. As attitudes concerning the intrinsic value of personalty
changed, however, the distribution between personalty and realty
also changed. Personal property, especially intangible personal
property,3 now comprises the bulk of wealth in the United States.4
1. "Escheat" generally is "reversion of property to the state in consequence of a want of
any individual to inherit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (5th ed. 1979). Although the term
in medieval times referred only to state acquisition of title to real property, see infra note 2
and accompanying text, this Note uses the term in its broader sense, which includes state
acquisition of an interest in the title to or the possession of any property. Accord 1 A. AN-
DREOLI & D. SHUMAN, GUIDE TO UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AND ESCHEAT LAWS ch. 2:1 (1985).
2. See Garrison, Escheats, Abandoned Property Acts, and Their Revenue Aspects, 35 Ky.
L.J. 302, 302 (1947); Note, Origins and Development of Modern Escheat, 61 COLUm. L. Rxv.
1319, 1319-20 (1961).
3. "Intangible property" is property that "has no intrinsic and marketable value, but is
merely the representative or evidence of value, such as certificates of stocks, bonds, [and]
promissory notes." BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 726 (5th ed. 1979).
4. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1985, at 461 (1984) (assets of top U.S. wealthholders between 1953 and 1976
comprised of between 23.0 and 34.8 percent real property and between 65.2 and 77.0 percent
personal property).
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Consequently, states increasingly have concentrated their efforts to
acquire abandoned property on this formerly untapped fiscal
resource.
Most states have adopted acts providing for the acquisition of
intangible as well as tangible property. The Virginia Uniform Dis-
position of Unclaimed Property Act 5 (Act), for example, covers vir-
tually every type of intangible personalty, including stock divi-
dends, wages, bank deposits, and traveler's checks." Because
Virginia recently has enacted provisions designed to facilitate en-
forcement of the Act,7 millions of dollars soon may become availa-
ble to the Commonwealth.
This Note examines Virginia's acquisition of unclaimed and
abandoned personalty in the context of modern jurisprudence. The
Note first traces the evolution of states' power to escheat aban-
doned tangible personalty, focusing both generally on the doctrine
and specifically on its status in Virginia. This survey starts with
the humble common law origins of the doctrine, and ends with its
current expansive statutory expression. The Note then turns to a
similar analysis of intangible property. This analysis recounts the
development of successive uniform acts to harmonize and consoli-
date the state law governing unclaimed personalty, discusses the
policies underlying these acts, and considers the operation and ef-
fectiveness of the version adopted in Virginia. The Note identifies
three problems likely to arise in litigation under the Virginia
Act-retroactivity, contractual provisions allowing "private es-
cheat," and unreasonable holding charges. The Note concludes
that the Virginia courts and legislature should respond to these
problems in a way that promotes the policies behind the Act, and
suggests what those responses should be.
5. VA. CODE §§ 55-210.1 to .30 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
6. See id. § 55-210.2 (Supp. 1985) (definition of "intangible property").
7. See infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
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THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWER TO ESCHEAT
TANGIBLE PERSONALTY
Common Law Development
When an owner leaves behind personal property with the spe-
cific intent to terminate ownership, or when an owner, after a cas-
ual and unintentional loss, ceases all efforts to seek and reclaim
lost property, the law considers that property abandoned." Title to
abandoned property generally vests in the first person to assert do-
minion and control over it.9 Under the English common law doc-
trine known as bona vacantia,10 however, rights to some types of
personal property traditionally passed to the sovereign rather than
to the finder. Because no true owner of these types of property
could be ascertained, the bona vacantia doctrine considered the
Crown's claim to the property on behalf of society stronger than
the claim of the finder or other holder of the property.,,
The largest category of personalty considered bona vacantia was
goods left when a person died intestate without heirs.12 The doc-
trine also applied to personal property held in a failed trust,13 per-
sonal property held in the name of a dissolved corporation, 4 and
some forms of abandoned personal property such as wrecks, 15
8. See R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 1.6, at 8 (3d ed. 1975).
9. See id. § 3.1, at 24.
10. The term bona vacantia literally means "vacant goods." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 161
(5th ed. 1979).
11. See Garrison, supra note 2, at 303. The desire to avoid disputes among private claim-
ants also motivated application of the escheat concept. See Note, supra note 2, at 1327; see
also 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *299 (Title also vested in the Crown "to prevent that
strife and contention, which the mere title of occupancy is apt to create and continue."). See
generally F. ENEVER, BONA VACANTIA UNDER THE LAW OF ENGLAND (1927) (thoroughly dis-
cussing the bona vacantia doctrine).
12. Note, supra note 2, at 1327. Modern intestate succession statutes treat this category
of property similarly. See, e.g., UNIs. PROBATE CODE § 2-105, 8 U.L.A. 65 (1983) ("If there is
no taker under the provisions of this Article, the intestate estate passes to the [state]."); VA.
CODE § 64.1-12 (1980) ("[A]ll the personal estate of every decedent, of which there is no
other distributee [shall accrue to the Commonwealth].").
13. Note, supra note 2, at 1327.
14. Id. at 1328.
15. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *290-94. "Wrecks" were goods or cargo,
thrown upon the land from a shipwreck, for which no owner could be ascertained. Id. at
*290, *291.
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treasure troves,16 waifs, 1  and estrays.'5 Under the doctrine, all
these types of property escheated to the Crown.
After the American Revolution, certain inherent sovereign pow-
ers vested in the new states, including power to determine the dis-
position of property.19 Many of the new states, faced with the deci-
sional void created by the separation from British authority,20
adopted the common law of England.21 In doing so, these states
implicitly adopted the bona vacantia doctrine.22
Because acquisition of property in the limited bona vacantia
categories produced little revenue, some jurisdictions enacted com-
prehensive legislation expanding the categories of tangible person-
alty subject to escheat.2 s Despite these attempts, however, the
16. A "treasure trove" was "money or coin, gold, silver, plate, or bullion ... found hid-
den in the earth, or other private place, the owner thereof being unknown." Id. at *295
(emphasis in original).
17. "Waifs" were "goods stolen, and waved or thrown away by the thief in his flight, for
fear of being apprehended." Id. The bona vacantia doctrine gave these goods to the king to
punish the owner for not pursuing the thief and capturing the goods. Id.
18. "Estrays" were valuable animals found wandering loose with no known owners. Id. at
*297.
19. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 435-36 (1951) (states' power to
dispose of unknown owners' property derives from a broad principle of jurisprudence); Cun-
nius v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1905) (state may provide for administration of
the estate of a person who has been missing for seven years and has been presumed dead,
after publishing notice).
20. See 9 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE 126 (1821) (Virginia Ordinances of Convention,
ch. V, § I (1776)).
21. The Virginia Ordinances of Convention, for example, provided:
[T]he common law of England, all statutes or acts of parliament made in aid of
the common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of king James the first,
and which are of a general nature, not local to that kingdom, together with the
several acts of the general assembly of this colony now in force, so far as the
same may consist with the several ordinances, declarations, and resolutions of
the general convention, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as
in full force, until the same shall be altered by the legislative power of this
colony.
Id. at 127 (Virginia Ordinances of Convention, ch. V, § VI (1776)). The common law of
England still is the rule of decision in Virginia except when the General Assembly has al-
tered it. See VA. CODE § 1-10 (1979).
22. Once it was adopted in the United States, bona vacantia lost its importance, as the
concept of escheat came to govern state acquisition of both real and personal property.
See supra note 1; Note, supra note 2, at 1327.
23. See McThenia & Epstein, Issues of Sovereignty in Escheat and the Uniform Un-
claimed Property Act, 40 WASH. & LEE L. RE V. 1429, 1431 (1983); Note, Unclaimed Prop-
erty-A Potential Source of Non-Tax Revenue, 45 Mo. L. REv. 493, 493 (1980).
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relative monetary significance of escheated tangible property de-
clined with time.24 Today, revenue produced by income and sales
taxes dwarfs the fiscal importance of tangible escheats.2' Neverthe-
less, most states, including Virginia, continue to escheat some
forms of tangible assets.
Adoption in Virginia
Virginia generally adheres to the common law rules governing
disposition of abandoned and unclaimed tangible personalty,
under which the finder usually acquires title to the property.2
Other states, desiring to vest title to this property in the state in-
stead of the finder, have replaced the common law rules with broad
legislation.2 7 Virginia, however, never has adopted similar legisla-
tion. In fact, the Commonwealth appears to have relinquished
some of the rights it implicitly acquired when it adopted the com-
mon law rule. For example, the Virginia Code provides that title to
estrays and drift property accrues to the owner of the land on
which the property is found if the true owner cannot be located,28
while at common law title to both of these types of property ac-
crued to the Crown as bona vacantia.2 9 These provisions of the
Virginia Code have expanded the rights that finders of abandoned
tangible property had under common law, and have diminished the
Commonwealth's rights.
On the other hand, three statutory exceptions to the Virginia
version of the common law rule have expanded the Common-
wealth's rights to abandoned and unclaimed tangible property, and
24. See Garrison, supra note 2, at 314-15.
25. See id.
26. See Talley v. Drumheller, 143 Va. 439, 449, 130 S.E. 385, 388 (1925); see also Wiggins
v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F. Supp. 452, 456 (E.D. Va. 1960) (quot-
ing with approval the general rule, as stated in 1 C.J.S. Abandonment § 9, at 18 (1936); same
rule now stated in 1 C.J.S. Abandonment § 12, at 19-20 (1985)).
27. See supra note 23.
28. See VA. CODE §§ 55-202 to -210 (1981). The term "drift property" or "drift stuff"
refers to goods "floating at random, without any known or discoverable ownership, which, if
cast ashore, will probably never be reclaimed, but will, as a matter of course, accrue to the
riparian proprietor." Watson v. Knowles, 13 R.I. 639, 641 (1882).
29. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *297 (estrays); id. at *292 (drift property).
Blackstone refers to drift property as "flotsam." See id. ("[F]lotsam is where [goods are cast
into the sea and] continue swimming on the surface of the waves.").
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have diminished finders' rights. First, Virginia and its municipali-
ties can acquire and sell abandoned motor vehicles to benefit the
Commonwealth.3 0 The Virginia Code permits the Commonwealth
to take possession of any vehicles left unattended for more than
twenty-four hours31 and permits municipalities to take possession
of any vehicles left unattended for more than ten days.32 If the
Commonwealth or municipality cannot determine the identity of
the owner or his whereabouts within thirty days, it may dispose of
the vehicle at a public sale. A municipality gets the proceeds of
any sale after three years if the owner does not claim them.3 4 Sur-
prisingly, however, the proceeds of a sale by the Commonwealth
remain available to the owner in perpetuity.3 5
Second, Virginia can acquire certain tangible property volunta-
rily reported to the Commonwealth. Under Virginia's unclaimed
property act, any holder of tangible personal property for which
the true owner cannot be located may report the property to the
State Treasurer.36 Once the Treasurer receives the holder's report,
the statute creates a presumption that the true owner of the prop-
erty has abandoned it.37 The presumption triggers another provi-
sion that requires the holder to relinquish the property to the
Commonwealth.38 Because this statute turns a holder's voluntary
30. VA. CODE §§ 46.1-2 to -3.01 (1980 & Supp. 1985).
31. Id. § 46.1-2 (1980). If the vehicle has remained "in a specific location for ten days
without being moved," and "does not bear a current license plate or a valid state inspection
certificate or sticker," the statute creates a presumption that the vehicle is abandoned. Id. §
46.1-2(c).
32. Id. § 46.1-3 (Supp. 1985). If the vehicle has remained "in a specific location for four
days without being moved" and "lacks either. . . a current license plate, or. . . a current
county, city or town, plate or sticker, or . . . a valid state inspection certificate or sticker,"
the statute creates a presumption that the vehicle is abandoned. Id. The statute does not
explain why the periods for authorization of seizure and for presumption of abandonment
differ for the Commonwealth and for municipalities.
33. Id. §§ 46.1-2, -3 (1980 & Supp. 1985).
34. Id. § 46.1-3 (Supp. 1985).
35. Id. § 46.1-2 (1980). Although the statute does not explain why municipalities eventu-
ally get the proceeds of these sales but the Commonwealth does not, one possible explana-
tion is that the General Assembly did not wish to burden municipalities with the additional
administrative costs associated with a custodial statute.
36. Id. § 55-210.10:2 (Supp. 1985). This provision is unique to Virginia's version of the
Uniform Unclaimed Property Act.
37. Id.
38. Id. § 55-210.14.
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report of property into a relinquishment of all common law rights
to the property, few holders are likely to report property under
this provision. As a result, the statutory exception has little future
as a revenue generating device. 9
Third, Virginia can acquire tangible property that is "held, is-
sued, or owing in the ordinary course of the holder's business and
has remained unclaimed by the owner for more than five years af-
ter it became payable or distributable. '40 Under Virginia's un-
claimed property act, property meeting the requirements of this
statutory exception is presumed abandoned by its true owner. The
holder of such property must report it, 4 and eventually must pay
or deliver it, 42 to the Commonwealth. Similar provisions also give
the Commonwealth the right to acquire tangible property held in a
safe deposit box if the property remains unclaimed for more than
five years after the lease or rental period of the box expires.
43
39. Virginia's inclusion of the voluntary reporting provision for tangible property may
have been a response to the situation that precipitated a 1971 opinion by the Attorney
General. The Rockingham County Commonwealth's Attorney had requested an opinion con-
cerning the proper disposition of seven chain saws that had been recovered from a river
bottom and that were in the possession of the sheriff's department. The police had recov-
ered one of the saws, and private individuals had recovered the other six and had relin-
quished them to the sheriff's department. The department had been unable to determine
the ownership of any of the saws. 1971-72 Op. Att'y Gen. 97 (Va. 1972). The Attorney Gen-
eral concluded that no statutory authority existed for the disposition of the saws because
"[t]he Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act... deals only with intangible prop-
erty or tangible property in safe deposit boxes." Id. As a result, according to the Attorney
General, the six voluntarily relinquished chain saws had to be returned to the private find-
ers as lost property. Id. The other saw, according to the Attorney General, should be treated
as the legal equivalent of an abandoned motor vehicle governed by section 46.1-3 of the
Virginia Code. Id. at 98; see also supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text (discussing the
abandoned motor vehicle provisions). Section 46.1-3 also should apply to the other six saws,
the Attorney General opined, if the finders refused to accept them. 1971-72 Op. Att'y Gen.
at 98.
40. VA. CODE § 55-210.2:1 (Supp. 1985). The precise scope of the provision is indetermi-
nate because it is peculiar to the Virginia Act and the Virginia courts have not interpreted it
yet.
41. Id. § 55-210.12.
* 42. Id. § 55-210.14.
43. Id. § 55-210.3:3.
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THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWER TO ESCHEAT
INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
Development of the Power to Escheat
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the states'
rights to control disposition of intangible as well as tangible aban-
doned property in Cunnius v. Reading School District,44 decided
in 1905. The Court in that case considered the validity of a Penn-
sylvania statute that provided for "the grant of letters of adminis-
tration upon the estates of persons, presumed to be dead, by rea-
son of [a seven year or longer] absence from their former
domicil. ' '45 Acting under this authority, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania had granted a letter of administration to the son of a
resident woman who had been missing from the Commonwealth
for nine years. The letter, among other things, permitted the son to
collect a debt consisting of accrued interest on the missing wo-
man's dower rights in a parcel of real estate.48 The Court upheld
the statute.47 The Court did not mention the intangible nature of
the property specifically, but it did state that "the right to regulate
the estates of absentees. . . has [always] been recognized as being
within the scope of governmental authority. '48
Development of Comprehensive Statutes
Early Statutory Responses
Following Cunnius, an increasing number of states scrambled to
escheat intangible property, apparently realizing its great revenue
generating potential. Some states sought to acquire intangible
property merely by extending the coverage of their laws governing
escheat of tangible personalty, but courts rejected these attempts
and required particularized statutes.49 These courts reasoned that
the states' rights to acquire tangible property had originated from
44. 198 U.S. 458 (1905).
45. Id. at 458 (quoting Act of June 24, 1885, 1885 Pa. Laws. 155 (repealed 1917)).
46. Id. at 460-61.
47. See id. at 476-77.
48. Id. at 471.
49. See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1939); State v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 212 Ark. 530, 206 S.W.2d 771 (1947).
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a doctrine covering property with no legal owner,5 while the
states, after Cunnius, were attempting to expand this doctrine to
cover unclaimed intangible property when the property did have
an owner, but the identity of that owner or his whereabouts was
unknown.51 Although the states could expand the categories of tan-
gible property subject to escheat, these courts concluded, they
could not expand the categories of escheatable property to include
intangible assets without specific statutory authority.52
The states responded to these decisions by enacting various es-
cheat statutes that applied explicitly to intangible property. These
statutes, however, were disorganized 53 and narrowly focused. Vir-
ginia, for example, first attempted to authorize acquisition of un-
claimed intangible property in 1887 through a statute that applied
solely to funds held by its courts. 4 Virginia also enacted legislation
in 1918 covering unclaimed bank deposits,55 but it did not attempt,
early on, to pass comprehensive legislation governing the escheat
of unclaimed property.
Uniform Acts
By the early 1950's, the states had begun clamoring for uniform
legislation addressing the escheat of intangible property. In re-
sponse, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
50. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58, 68 (7th Cir. 1939); State v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 212 Ark. 530, -, 206 S.W.2d 771, 773 (1947); see supra notes 8-18 and
accompanying text.
51. State v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 212 Ark. 530, -, 206 S.W.2d 771, 773 (1947); see
Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58, 62 (7th Cir. 1939).
52. State v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 212 Ark. 530, -_, 206 S.W.2d 771, 776 (1947); see
Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58, 68 (7th Cir. 1939).
53. See UNIF. DIsPOSrrlON OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AcT (1954) prefatory note, 8A U.L.A.
215 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1954 AcT].
54. See VA. CODE §§ 3429-3432 (1887) (current version at VA. CODE §§ 8.01-600, -602 to -
605 (1984)). The statute allowed any court of the Commonwealth to pay any monies that it
had held for seven years to the Commonwealth, provided that the court knew of no owner or
claimant of the money. Id. §§ 3429, 3430. Although ostensibly custodial, the statute limited
the period during which the owner could claim and recover the property to ten years, run-
ning from the time the claim could have been presented or asserted. See id. § 3432 (refer-
ring to limitations imposed under sections 751 and 770).
55. See Act of Mar. 15, 1918, ch. 252, § 1, 1918 Va. Acts 430 (repealed 1928).
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State Laws began drafting comprehensive legislation.56 The Com-
missioners ultimately produced three uniform acts. The first,
promulgated in 1954, was the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed
Property Act.57 The 1954 act consisted of thirty-two sections,58 in-
cluding one purporting to aid the settlement of concurrent claims
to the same property by two or more states.5 9 The second act,
promulgated in 1966, was a revision of the 1954 act designed to
address the special problems associated with the escheat of money
orders and traveler's checks.6 0 The third and final act, promulgated
in 1981, was the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act.6 The 1981 act
harmonized the previous acts with the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Texas v. New Jersey,2 in which the
Court had established a hierarchy of escheat among several claim-
ant states that was inconsistent with the hierarchy established in
the 1954 act.6 3 The 1981 act also contained strengthened enforce-
ment provisions to assist the states' efforts to monitor compliance
by holders.4 To date, thirty-five states and the District of
56. Before the first uniform act, many state statutes had covered the disposition of un-
claimed bank deposits, but only ten states had enacted comprehensive legislation covering
the entire field of unclaimed property. See 1954 ACT, supra note 53, prefatory note, 8A
U.L.A. at 215.
57. 1954 ACT, supra note 53.
58. For a brief discussion of the 1954 act, see id. prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at 216-17.
59. Id. § 10, 8A U.L.A. at 244-45. This section was designed to "preclude the possibility of
multiple liability being imposed upon the holder of unclaimed property who happens to be
subject to the jurisdiction of two or more states." Id. prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at 217.
60. See UNIF. DisPosIrioN OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT (1966) prefatory note, 8A U.L.A.
136 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1966 ACT]. For example, the 1966 act eliminated the re-
quirement that holders of money orders or traveler's checks report the names and addresses
of the owners, because these holders generally do not know the owner. See id.
61. UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AT (1981 ACT), 8A U.L.A. 617 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as 1981 ACT].
62. 379 U.S. 674 (1965); see 1981 ACT, supra note 61, prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at 620-21.
63. See 1981 ACT, supra note 61, prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at 619.
64. Id. § 34, 8A U.L.A. at 674. Section 34 provided that a person who fails to deliver
property to the state within the prescribed period may be required to pay interest. See id. §
34(a), 8A U.L.A. at 674. In the 1966 act, the predecessor to section 34 did not provide for
interest on improperly withheld funds. See 1966 AT, supra note 60, § 25, 8A U.L.A. at 209.
The predecessor section did provide for fines and imprisonment, id., but these criminal
sanctions proved ineffective. See 1981 ACT, supra note 61, § 34 commentary, 8A U.L.A. at
674.
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Columbia have adopted one of the uniform acts, or a combination
of these acts, in some form.e5
According to the Commissioners, the uniform acts promote at
least three important policies. 6e First, the acts protect unknown or
unlocatable owners by requiring attempts to reunite the owner
with his property by both holders and the adopting state before
the property is transferred to the state,67 and by preventing any
statute of limitations from running on the state's claim against a
holder.6 8 Second, the acts purport to "relieve. . .holders from an-
noyance, expense and liability, '6 9 including multiple liability, 0
65. See 8A U.L.A. table of jurisdictions, at 30 (Supp. 1985) (five states have adopted the
1954 act); id. table of jurisdictions, at 17 (twenty-two states and the District of Columbia
have adopted the 1966 act); id. table of jurisdictions, at 129 (twelve states have adopted the
1981 act). The tables of jurisdictions list Iowa, Nevada, Oregon, and Tennessee as states
that have adopted both the 1966 act and 1981 act because these four states have followed
the format of the 1966 act, but also have adopted many of the provisions of the 1981 act.
Compare id. table of jurisdictions, at 17 (1966 act) with id. table of jurisdictions, at 129
(1981 act).
For an excellent analysis of the uniform acts, see 1 D. EPSTEIN, A. McTHENIA, JR. & C.
FORSLUND, UNCLAIMED PROPERTY LAW AND REPORTING FORMS (1985).
66. See 1954 AcT, supra note 53, prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at 217. For a more compre-
hensive discussion of these and other rationales, see Note, Modern Rationales of Escheat,
112 U. PA. L. REv. 95, 96-111 (1963).
67. 1981 AT, supra note 61, § 17, 8A U.L.A. at 652-53. Some states have been very suc-
cessful in returning forgotten property to owners. See McThenia & Epstein, supra note 23,
at 1432.
68. 1981 ACT, supra note 61, § 29(a), 8A U.L.A. at 667. At common law, statutes of limi-
tations and other claim prerequisites not only had precluded owners from asserting claims
against the holders of their property, but also had precluded states from asserting escheat
claims against these holders on the theory that the states' claims derive from the owners'
claims and therefore cannot exceed them in nature or scope. See, e.g., Oregon Racing
Comm'n v. Multnomah Kennel Club, 242 Or. 572, 411 P.2d 63 (1963) (requirement that
claimants present tickets precluded state from escheating winnings from unpresented pari-
mutuel tickets); Murdock v. Stetson, 32 Pa. D. & C.2d (1936) (requirement that claimant
present Stetson Hat gift certificates precluded Commonwealth from escheating value of un-
redeemed certificates). Section 29(a) of the 1981 act eliminated the statute of limitations as
a method by which a holder can retain possession of an owner's property in the face of a
claim by an adopting state.
69. 1954 ACT, supra note 53, prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at 217.
70. Before the uniform acts, a holder could have become subject to double liability "[i]f
two [states' escheat] statutes cover[ed] the same items of property, and if each state
[sought] to exercise its jurisdiction." 1954 ACT, supra note 53, prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at
216. The uniform acts remedy the multiple liability problem by relieving holders of all lia-
bility after they deliver the property to the state. 1981 ACT, supra note 61, § 20(a), 8A
U.L.A. at 656.
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associated with maintaining their own unclaimed property funds.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the acts provide adopting
states with a method for raising revenue, thereby promoting the
general welfare of the community.
Although the revenue generating potential of escheat has been
the foremost concern of legislators, it also has been the aspect that
they have been least likely to express.71 Even the Commissioners
did not express this justification unequivocally, couching it primar-
ily in terms of preventing unjust enrichment.72 The uniform acts
do prevent unjust enrichment by precluding a holder from receiv-
ing a "windfall"s7 or getting "something for nothing, '7 4 and by
conserving the property for the true owner.75 Because forgetfulness
and death prevent most owners from reappearing to claim their
property from the state,7e however, the ultimate result usually is
not protection of the owner, but instead is escheat of property to
the state, which can use it for the public good.
Comprehensive Statutory Response in Virginia: The Virginia
Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act
Although Virginia sought to acquire intangible personalty begin-
ning in 1887, the Commonwealth did not enact a comprehensive
statutory scheme covering unclaimed intangible property until
71. See Note, supra note 66, at 102; see also State v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 36 N.J.
577, - , 178 A.2d 329, 334 ("The [New Jersey escheat] statute ... manifests the legisla-
tive will that ... unclaimed moneys be used for the good of all our citi7ens."), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 158 (1962).
72. See 1954 Acr, supra note 53, prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at 217 (listing as one of the
purposes of the uniform acts the need "to . . . give the adopting state the use of some
considerable sums of money that otherwise would, in effect, become a windfall to the hold-
ers thereof.").
73. Id.
74. Note, supra note 66, at 101.
75. The uniform acts, as "custodial escheat statutes," essentially require the adopting
state to hold property for the true owner until he reclaims the property, and never give the
state a full ownership interest in the property. See, e.g., 1954 AcT, supra note 53, prefatory
note, 8A U.L.A. at 216; 1981 AcT, supra note 61, prefatory note & n.3, 8A U.L.A. at 620 &
n.3.
76. See Shestack, Disposition of Unclaimed Property-A Proposed Model Act, 46 ILL. L.
Rv. 48, 48 (1951); Note, supra note 66, at 98 & n.19. But see Garrison, supra note 2, at 316
(noting that, in Kentucky, diligent efforts to find owners have reduced the amount of an-
claimed property escheated by the state).
77. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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1960, when it adopted the 1954 uniform act."5 Between 1980 and
1983, the General Assembly updated Virginia's unclaimed property
statute to reflect the Commissioners' revisions to the 1954 uniform
act.79 Finally, in 1984, the General Assembly essentially rewrote
the old legislation, enacting most of the provisions contained in the
1981 uniform act.80
General Procedures Under the Act
As it now stands, the Virginia Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed
Property Act"l applies to several categories of intangible property
left unclaimed for various statutory periods. Once the statutory pe-
riod for a particular item of property has elapsed,8 2 the Act re-
quires the holder to attempt diligently to reunite the true owner
with his property.83 If the holder's efforts prove fruitless, the Act
creates a presumption that the property has been abandoned,
4
and the holder must include the property in an annual report to
78. Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, ch. 330, 1960 Va. Acts 385.
79. Act of Mar. 15, 1983, ch. 190, 1983 Va. Acts 209; Act of Apr. 9, 1982, ch. 331, 1982 Va.
Acts 537; Act of Mar. 5, 1981, ch. 47, 1981 Va. Acts 54; Act of Mar. 22, 1980, ch. 293, 1980
Va. Acts 323.
80. Act of Mar. 10, 1984, ch. 121, 1984 Va. Acts 262.
81. VA. CODE §§ 55-210.1 to .30 (1981 & Supp. 1985); see supra notes 5-7 and accompany-
ing text.
82. The statutory period for intangible property under the Act varies from one year, e.g.,
VA. CODE § 55-210.5 (Supp. 1985) (deposits held by utilities), to fifteen years, id. § 55-
210.3:02 (traveler's checks).
83. See id. § 55-210.12(e). The diligence required by the statute includes, but is not lim-
ited to, mailing a first-class letter to the last address of the owner contained in the holder's
records. Id.
84. The presumption is created in the sections containing the rules for disposition of the
various classes of unclaimed property, which explicitly create a presumption of abandon-
ment based on the running of the statutory period. See, e.g., id. § 55-210.2. The presump-
tion, however, is rather ambiguous because of language in the due diligence provision stat-
ing- "If the holder of property presumed abandoned . . . knows the whereabouts of the
owner, the holder shall ... take necessary steps to prevent abandonment from being pre-
sumed." Id. § 55-210.12(e) (emphasis added). The ambiguity arises because, if the law prop-
erly has declared that the property is presumptively abandoned, the holder cannot subse-
quently prevent that presumption from attaching. To harmonize this provision with the rest
of the Act, it should be interpreted as requiring the holder to attempt to rebut the presump-
tion of abandonment before listing the property on the annual report to the State
Treasurer.
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the State Treasurer85 due by the first of November each year.86 By
the first of March, working from the names and last known ad-
dresses of property owners provided in these annual reports by
holders throughout the Commonwealth, the State Treasurer must
publish a list in a newspaper of general circulation in each county
containing the names of property owners last known to have re-
sided in that county. 7 Each holder has three months from publica-
tion to relinquish the property to the State Treasurer.8 Once the
holder delivers the property to the Treasurer, the Commonwealth
assumes custody, and the holder is relieved of all liability to the
owner.
88
The Act empowers the Treasurer to sell all relinquished un-
claimed property. After selecting the most favorable location in
which to conduct a sale, and publishing a notice three weeks before
the sale in a newspaper of general circulation in that area, the
Treasurer may proceed with the sale. 0 The Act requires the Trea-
surer to maintain a separate trust fund containing funds sufficient
to satisfy claims of subsequently appearing owners.91 Most of the
sales proceeds, however, as well as funds received directly as un-
claimed property, must be deposited in the Literary Fund of the
Commonwealth, 2 which provides low interest loans93 to various
85. Id. § 55-210.12(a). This provision actually refers to the "administrator" rather than
the "State Treasurer." Because the Act defines the "administrator" as the "State Trea-
surer or his designee," id. § 55-210.2, and to reduce confusion, this Note refers only to the
State Treasurer.
86. Id. § 55-210.12(d). Insurance corporations must file this report before the first of May
each year. Id.
87. Id. § 55-210.13. The list for insurance corporations must be published by the first of
September. Id.
88. Id. § 55-210.14 (referring to "the time specified in § 55-210.13(b)(3)").
89. Id. § 55-210.15(a).
90. Id. § 55-210.18.
91. Id. § 55-210.19(a). The true owner may recover escheated property in two ways. First,
the owner may make a claim against the former holder. If the owner presents sufficient
evidence of ownership to satisfy the holder, the holder may pay the owner's claim and then
receive reimbursement from the Commonwealth. Id. § 55-210.15(a). Second, the owner may
proceed directly against the Commonwealth for return of the property, or its monetary
equivalent if the Commonwealth already has sold the property. See id. §§ 55-210.20 to .22
(1981). Virginia's recovery methods conform substantially to the 1981 uniform act. See 1981
AcT, supra note 61, §§ 20, 24, 8A U.L.A. at 657, 661.
92. VA. CODE § 55-210.19(a) (Supp. 1985). The provisions governing the Literary Fund are
contained in VA. CODE §§ 22.1-142 to -161 (1985).
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school boards for the construction of new educational facilities or
the enlargement of existing facilities. 4 By placing these monies in
the Literary Fund, the Commonwealth employs its power over un-
claimed property to improve the general welfare of its citizens.
Property Included Under the Act
The Virginia Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act includes
specific provisions governing the acquisition of bank deposits and
funds in financial institutions;95 traveler's checks and money or-
ders;96 checks, drafts, or similar instruments such as cashier's
checks and certified checks;97 the contents of safe deposit boxes or
other repositories; 8 funds owing under life or endowment insur-
ance policies or annuity contracts;99 deposits held by utilities;100
stocks, dividends, and other sums owed by business associations;'01
funds remaining after court-ordered refunds by business associa-
tions;102 property of business associations held in the course of dis-
solution;10 3 certain property held by fiduciaries; 1'0 gift certificates
and credit memos;10 5 unclaimed wages;106 private property heldby
public agencies;107 private property held by state and federal
courts;'08 and employee benefit trust distributions. 09 Additionally,
an omnibus provision encompasses all tangible and intangible
property not specifically included or excluded elsewhere in the
93. VA. CODE § 22.1-150 (1985) (interest of not less than two and not more than six per-
cent per year, payable annually).
94. Id. § 22.1-146.
95. Id. § 55-210.3:01 (Supp. 1985).
96. Id. § 55-210.3:02.
97. Id. § 55-210.3:2.
98. Id. § 55-210.3:3; see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
99. VA. CODE § 55-210.4:01 (Supp. 1985).
100. Id. § 55-210.5.
101. Id. § 55-210.6 to .6:1.
102. Id. §§ 55-210.6:2.
103. Id. § 55-210.7.
104. Id. § 55-210.8.
105. Id. § 55-210.8:1.
106. Id. § 55-210.8:2.
107. Id. § 55-210.9.
108. Id. § 55-210.9:1.
109. Id. § 55-210.10:1.
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Act.110 Finally, the Act provides for the escheat of some forms of
tangible property, including property located in safe deposit boxes,
property owing in the ordinary course of a holder's business, and
property voluntarily reported to the Commonwealth."'
Enforcement
The State Treasurer can require any person to file a verified re-
port stating whether he holds any reportable unclaimed prop-
erty.1 1 2 The Treasurer also can examine the records of any person
to determine if that person has been complying with the Act. 13
Significantly, however, the Treasurer no longer needs to have "rea-
son to believe that the holder has failed to report property" before
he can examine a person's records."4
The Act also contains similar reporting requirements for finan-
cial institutions and businesses. For example, when a financial in-
stitution, a banking organization, or a business association with an-
nual sales of at least $10,000,000 is required to report abandoned
110. Id. § 55-210.2:2. Other jurisdictions have interpreted similar catch-all provisions as
including such articles as trading stamps, New Jersey v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 56 N.J.
Super. 589, 153 A.2d 691 (1959), pari-mutuel ticket winnings, Oregon Racing Comm'n v.
Multnomah Kennel Club, 242 Or. 572, 411 P.2d 63 (1963), residuals, Screen Actors Guild,
Inc. v. Cory, 91 Cal. App. 3d 111, 154 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1979), and oil royalties, Citronelle-
Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Boswell, 341 So. 2d 933 (Ala. 1977).
111., See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
Virginia's inclusion of the latter two categories of tangible property expands the coverage
of the uniform acts, which apply only to the contents of safe deposit boxes. See 1981 ACT,
supra note 61, § 1 comment, 8A U.L.A. at 629. The uniform acts' intended application only
to intangible property, except for the contents of safe deposit boxes, was brought out in a
colorful colloquy in the Commissioners' committee reports:
MR. KOHN: ... I notice ... tangible property referred to at the bottom of
page 10. I thought you said a few minutes ago that tangible property was not
included.
MR. STASON: Not except that that comes out of a safe deposit box.
MR. KOHN: It couldn't be an elephant.
MR. STASON: It couldn't be an elephant or yet an umbrella.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM ACT FOR THE
DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY, PROCEEDINGS IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, AuG. 10,
1954, at 94-95 [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
112. VA. CODE § 55-210.24(A) (Supp. 1985).
113. Id. § 55-210.24(B).
114. See id.; see also 1981 AT, supra note 61, § 30 comment, 8A U.L.A. at 669 (noting
that the "reason to believe" requirement was dropped from the 1981 act because it gener-
ated excessive litigation and imposed an unreasonable burden on the state).
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property to the Treasurer, it must retain for ten years, for each
reported item of property, a record of the owner's name and last
known address.1 ' Additionally, any business that sells money or-
ders or traveler's checks must maintain a record of those instru-
ments for three years.11 6 If a business fails to maintain this record,
it must report and pay to the Treasurer a reasonable estimate of
the amount that would have been reported had the business kept
the required record.117
Unlike earlier versions, the current Virginia Act provides for in-
terest and penalties. A person who, after receiving a written de-
mand from the Treasurer, fails to report abandoned property or to
perform other duties required by the Act may be assessed a civil
penalty of up to $100 a day. 18 In addition, a person who fails to
pay or deliver property after receiving a written demand from the
Treasurer may be assessed a penalty equaling twenty-five percent
of the value of the property withheld. 9 In these situations, the
Commonwealth also may charge interest on late delivery of any
property.1 20
Now that Virginia has the power to assess interest and penalties
against recalcitrant or negligent holders of unclaimed property, lit-
igation inevitably will occur. In this litigation, the Commonwealth
probably will encounter a number of problems, fundamental to
state acquisition of unclaimed property, for which the sparse prior
judicial consideration in Virginia will provide little guidance. The
experience of other states with these problems could be
instructive. 21
115. VA. CODE § 55-210.24:1(A) (Supp. 1985). This record is designed to provide evidence
in resolving disputes between two or more states claiming the same property. See 1981 AcT,
supra note 61, § 30 comment, 8A U.L.A. at 670. The Supreme Court has stated that, in
such disputes, the owner's last known address is a determinative factor. See Texas v. New
Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 681-82 (1965).
116. V& CODE § 55-210.24:1(B) (Supp. 1985).
117. Id. § 55-210.24(C).
118. Id. § 55-210.26:1.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. This Note does not address problems in escheat litigation that are related to juris-
dictional issues. For a general discussion of these issues, see McThenia & Epstein, supra
note 23.
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IssuEs LIKELY TO ARISE IN LITIGATION UNDER THE VIRGINIA
UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT
Retroactive Application of Escheat Statutes
One of the questions often associated with the escheat of un-
claimed property is the extent of a state's ability to escheat prop-
erty that had been left unclaimed before that state's escheat stat-
ute took effect. Although many states, including Virginia, first
enacted comprehensive escheat provisions more than two decades
ago, this retroactivity question still arises whenever a state discov-
ers property reachable under its statute that has remained unes-
cheated for many years. 122 Such property can remain unescheated
only when the holder, for some reason, never files the required re-
ports 23 and the state never enforces the requirements by examin-
ing the holder's records.124 Virginia's adoption, along with many
other states, of the strengthened enforcement provisions in the
1981 uniform act 25 gives it the power to pursue these recalcitrant
or uninformed holders vigorously, and inevitably will cause the
Commonwealth to encounter the retroactivity issues associated
with escheat of this property.
In formulating the 1954 uniform act, the Commissioners debated
this retroactivity question. The Commissioners considered three
potential general limitations on an adopting state's ability to es-
cheat property that was left unclaimed before the state adopted
the uniform act: federal constitutional provisions; state constitu-
tional provisions; and state statutory and common law, including
statutes of limitations.126 Other than possible state law restrictions,
the Commissioners concluded that only practical record-keeping
considerations precluded them from drafting a uniform act that
122. See, e.g., State ex rel. Marsh v. Nebraska State Bd. of Agriculture, 217 Neb. 622, 350
N.W.2d 535 (1984) (State in 1980 sought to escheat pari-mutuel betting winnings left un-
claimed between 1960 and 1972, even though it did not pass an escheat statute until 1969).
123. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text (noting reporting procedures in Vir-
ginia, through which the Commonwealth escheats intangible personalty).
124. See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text (noting enforcement provisions in
Virginia).
125. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (noting strengthened enforcement
provisions in Virginia).
126. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 111, at 95, 106-07.
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reached "back to the beginning of time. ' 127  Because of the
probability of inadequate records, however, the Commissioners
limited the reporting requirements under the 1954 act to "property
that would have been presumed abandoned if th[e] act had been in
effect during the ten-year period preceding its effective date."'128
Virginia's adoption of a version of this provision 29 effectively cut
off its ability to escheat property left unclaimed before January 1,
1951.130
When the Commissioners adopted the ten-year retroactivity pro-
vision, they recognized that a problem might exist regarding claims
for property within the ten-year period because, in many states,
the running of the statute of limitations on a debt creates rights
vested in the debtor holder. 3  The Virginia Supreme Court, for
example, held in Kesterson v. Hill 2 that expiration of the applica-
ble statute of limitations gives a debtor a vested right to assert the
limitations defense. 13 3 In unclaimed property cases, the Kestersorn
127. Id. at 95.
128. 1954 AcT, supra note 53, § 11(g), 8A U.L.A. at 247; see PROCEEDINGS, supra note
111, at 95.
129. See VA. CODE § 55-210.12(g) (Supp. 1985) ("The initial report filed under this chap-
ter and the subsequent duty to pay or deliver shall include all items of property that would
have been presumed abandoned if this chapter had been in effect during the ten-year period
preceding January 1, 1961.").
130. The Virginia Act became effective on January 1, 1961. Uniform Disposition of Un-
claimed Property Act, ch. 330, § 2, 1960 Va. Acts 385, 392.
131. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 111, at 106.
132. 101 Va. 739, 45 S.E. 288 (1903).
133. See id. at 744-45, 45 S.E. at 288. The court's rationale rested on two generally-
accepted legal rules: first, the doctrine that expiration of a statute of limitation bars an
action on a debt, but does not extinguish the underlying cause of action; and second, the
doctrine that expiration of a limitations period gives a defendant a vested right "to set up
the bar of a statute of limitations as a defence to a cause of action" and that this vested
right "cannot be taken away by legislation, either by a repeal of the statute without saving
clause, or by an affirmative act." Id. at 743, 45 S.E. at 289. Although other jurisdictions
generally had accepted these doctrines, see, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Blodgett, 155 i. 441,
447, 40 N.E. 1025, 1027 (1895), the Virginia court never had considered them directly before
Kesterson. Nevertheless, the court found support for the doctrines, and for its holding in
Kesterson, in dicta from one of its previous decisions. See Kesterson, 101 Va. at 744, 45
S.E. at 289 (quoting Johnson v. Gill, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 587, 595 (1876)) ("It is very clear
that when the bar of the statute of limitations has once attached, the legislature cannot
remove the bar by retrospective legislation."). The court also noted a specific Virginia stat-
ute that prevented the repeal of a statute from removing a bar that had resulted from a
prior running of the statutory period. See id. at 744, 45 S.E. at 290 (quoting VA. CODE
§ 2936 (1887) (current version at VA. CODE § 8.01-234 (1984)).
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rule gives a holder of unclaimed property a vested right to defeat
an owner's claim once the statute of limitations has expired. Be-
cause most statutes of limitations are shorter than ten years, the
ten-year retroactivity provision reaches property for which the
statute of limitations already had expired before the provision took
effect and for which the limitations defense had vested under
Kesterson. The resulting conflict between the retroactivity provi-
sion and the Kesterson rule must be examined separately for
claims involving two distinct sets of property: property on which
the limitations period for claims had not run before the effective
date of the Virginia Act, i"4 and property on which the limitations
period for claims had run before the effective date.
Escheat When Claims Were Not Time-Barred Before the Act's
Effective Date
The first category of property claims consists of claims not time-
barred on January 1, 1961, when the Virginia Act took effect. For
example, this category would include a claim for uncollected wages
that arose when a worker employed under a written contract quit
his job on January 1, 1957 and neglected to collect his final
paycheck. Because the Virginia statute of limitations on claims
based on written contracts is five years, 13 5 the rule in Kesterson136
would give the worker's employer, on January 1, 1962, a vested
right to assert the limitations defense against any subsequent
claim by the forgetful employee. 13 7 Before this right would have
vested, however, the Act, effective January 1, 1961, would have im-
posed on the employer a statutory duty to report the unpaid
wages. s13
A hypothetical based on this employer demonstrates the retroac-
tive reach of the Virginia Act to property in this category. Suppose
that the employer never filed the required reports. Suppose further
that, while conducting a routine examination of the employer's
134. See supra note 130.
135. VA. CODE § 8.01-246(2) (1984). If the employee had been employed under an oral
contract, the statute of limitations would have been three years rather than five. Id. § 8.01-
246(4).
136. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
137. See supra text following note 133.
138. VA. CODE §§ 55-210.8:2, .12(a), .12(g) (Supp. 1985).
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records 1 9 in 1986, the State Treasurer discovers these unreported
unclaimed wages from 1957. Because the Kesterson rule would give
the employer in 1986 the right to raise the limitations defense
against a claim by the employee, and because states' rights to es-
cheat are considered by many courts as deriving from owners'
claims, 40 one might expect that the employer in this situation also
would be able to raise the limitations defense against the Com-
monwealth. Section 55-210.17 of the Virginia Act, however,
provides:
The expiration of any period of time specified by statute ...
during which an action or proceeding may be commenced or en-
forced to obtain payment of a claim for money or recovery of
property, shall not prevent the money or property from being
presumed abandoned property, nor affect any duty to... pay
or deliver abandoned property to the State Treasurer.""
Because of this provision, the Act's imposition in 1961 of an obliga-
tion to report and later to deliver the wages, and the resulting right
of the Commonwealth to escheat the wages,142 would not have been
affected by the expiration of the statute of limitations in 1962. The
Commonwealth, in 1986, would be able to recover wages originally
payable in 1957.
Interestingly, by permitting the Commonwealth to acquire aban-
doned property long after the statute of limitations has expired,
section 55-210.17 also revives the owner's ability to reclaim the
property. Because the Virginia Act, like most state escheat stat-
utes, gives the Commonwealth only a possessory interest in prop-
erty it acquires, 43 true owners can reclaim their property from the
Commonwealth at any time. Consequently, whenever Virginia ac-
quires unclaimed property after the statute of limitations has run
139. See id. § 55-210.24(B); supra note 113 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 68 (describing cases in which courts have held that states' escheat
claims derive from owners' claims); infra note 152 and accompanying text.
141. VA. CODE § 55-210.17 (1981).
142. The Commonwealth's right to escheat under the Act depends on its ability to enforce
the provisions mandating reporting and delivery of the wages. See supra notes 123-24 and
accompanying text.
143. VA. CODE §§ 55-210.20 to .21 (1981). Most state escheat statutes share this custodial
nature. See supra note 75; see, e.g., 1981 AcT, supra note 61, § 24, 8A U.L.A. at 661.
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against the owner, the Commonwealth, in effect, has lifted the bar
of the statute of limitations on the true owner's claim.I44
Escheat When Claims Were Time-Barred Before the Act's
Effective Date
The retroactive reach of the Virginia Act to the second category
of property is demonstrated by changing the above hypothetical,
placing the forgetful employee's resignation on January 1, 1952,
rather than January 1, 1957, so that the five-year statute of limita-
tions would have run before the Act became effective. Because the
original Virginia Act created a presumption that wages unclaimed
for seven years were abandoned, 45 and because the ten-year retro-
activity provision requires holders to report "all items of property
that would have been presumed abandoned if this chapter had
been in effect during the ten-year period preceding January 1,
1961, ''146 the employer would have had a duty under the Act to
report the unclaimed wages in his initial report to the State Trea-
surer. This duty would have arisen even though, under Kester-
son, 14 expiration of the statute of limitations on January 1, 1957
gave the employer a vested right to assert the limitations defense
against the employee 148 four years before the Virginia Act took ef-
fect and purportedly created a duty to report relating back to
1951.
In this situation, the conflict between the ten-year retroactivity
provision and the vesting rule in Kesterson becomes clear and di-
rect. Section 55-210.17 of the Act,149 which eliminated the same
conflict when the statute of limitations had not run before the Act
took effect,150 cannot resolve the conflict in this context unless that
section, when it became effective in 1961, applied retroactively to
144. This feature helps protect the unknown or unlocatable owner, which is an avowed
policy of unclaimed property acts. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
145. VA. CODE § 55-210.10 (1969) (amended 1984). In 1984, this provision was amended,
creating a presumption of abandonment only one year after the wages became payable. Id.
§ 55-210.8:2 (Supp. 1985).
146. Id. § 55-210.12(g) (Supp. 1985); see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
148. See supra text following note 133.
149. VA. CODE § 55-210.17 (1981).
150. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
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prevent the assertion of limitations defenses that already had
vested under the Kesterson rule. Virginia law, however, would not
allow legislative removal of a holder's vested limitations defense. 151
As a result, the Commonwealth's ability to escheat property when
the statute of limitations had run before the Act's effective date
depends on resolution of the conflict.
The key to resolving the conflict is the nature of Virginia's inter-
est in statutorily "abandoned" property. If the Commonwealth de-
rives its interest in the property from the interest of the true
owner, as courts in many other states have held,152 then the bar
against the owner's claim against the holder under the Kesterson
rule should operate to bar the Commonwealth's claim to the prop-
erty as well. If the Commonwealth does not derive its interest in
the property from the interest of the true owner, however, then the
bar against the owner's claim under Kesterson should not affect
the Commonwealth's claim to the property and, because statutes
of limitations generally do not run against the Commonwealth, 53
Virginia should be able to assert its claim.
Commentators addressing the nature of states' interests under
escheat statutes have concluded that states derive their interests
from the interests of true owners.154 The overwhelming weight of
judicial authority also has recognized the derivative nature of the
states' interests. 55 As the Supreme Court of Utah stated, "It is
well settled from the custodial nature of the Unclaimed Property
Act that the rights of the State are merely derivative from the
rights of the owners of abandoned property. '[T]he state has no
151. See Kesterson, 101 Va. at 744, 45 S.E. at 289 (quoting Johnson v. Gill, 68 Va. (27
Gratt.) 587, 595 (1876)) ("It is very clear that when the bar of the statute of limitations has
once attached, the legislature cannot remove the bar by retrospective legislation."); supra
note 133; see also infra notes 158-59 (noting that legislative divestment of a vested right is a
deprivation of property without due process of law that violates the Virginia Constitution).
152. See, e.g., State v. Standard Oil Co., 5 N.J. 281, 74 A.2d 565 (1950), afl'd sub nom.
Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951); Oregon Racing Comm'n v. Multnomah
Kennel Club, 242 Or. 572, 411 P.2d 63 (1963); Murdock v. Stetson, 32 Pa. D. & C.2d (1936);
State ex rel. Baker v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 668 P.2d 503 (Utah 1983); supra notes
68 & 140 and accompanying text.
153. VA. CODE § 8.01-231 (1984).
154. See, e.g., 1 A. ANDREOLI & D. SHUMAN, supra note 1, ch. 7:1; 1 D. EPsTEIN, A.
McTHENIA, JR. & C. FORSLUND, supra note 65, § 302.
155. See supra note 152.
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greater right than that of the payee owner.' ",156 Because Virginia
also has adopted the custodial uniform act,157 the Utah court's
statement should apply with equal force to the Commonwealth.
Virginia's rights to unclaimed property should be viewed as deriv-
ing from owners' rights and, therefore, as incapable of exceeding
the owners' rights. When the Kesterson rule would have prevented
an owner from defeating a holder's vested limitations defense, the
Commonwealth also must be subject to the limitations defense,
even when the ten-year retroactivity provision otherwise would al-
low the Commonwealth to reach the property.
The conclusion that Virginia's ten-year retroactivity provision
does not allow the Commonwealth to escheat property when the
holder's statute of limitations defense against the owner had
vested before the Act's effective date is consistent with Virginia
constitutional, statutory, and common law principles, as well as
with the results that other states have reached when confronted
with the same issue. For example, in Kennedy Coal Corp. v. Buck-
horn Coal Corp., 58 the Virginia Supreme Court held that legisla-
tive divestment of a vested right is a deprivation of property with-
out due process of law that violates the Virginia Constitution. 59 If
a holder of unclaimed property retained the property after the
statute of limitations period ran, and never had a duty to report or
deliver the property to the Commonwealth during the statute of
limitations period because the Act became effective at a later date,
the holder would have obtained a vested right under Kesterson to
assert the limitations defense. The General Assembly's subsequent
passage of the Act, and the ten-year retroactivity provision, would
be an attempt to defeat this vested right. Under Kennedy Coal,
this attempt arguably would violate the due process clause of the
Virginia Constitution."0
156. State ex rel. Baker v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 668 P.2d 503, 507 (Utah 1983)
(citations omitted) (quoting Insurance Co. v. Knight, 8 11. App. 3d 871, 876, 291 N.E.2d 40,
44 (1973)).
157. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
158. 140 Va. 37, 124 S.E. 482 (1924).
159. Id. at 43, 124 S.E. at 484.
160. The retroactivity provision, however, does not violate the fourteenth amendment due
process clause of the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has
held, "as a matter of [United States] constitutional law,. . . that statutes of limitation go to
matters of remedy, not to destruction of fundamental rights," Chase Securities Corp. v.
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For intangible property rights arising from contractual obliga-
tions, such as the unclaimed wages held by the employer in the
above hypothetical, the prohibition in the Virginia Constitution
against impairing the obligation of contracts1 6 1 also arguably sup-
ports the limitation on the ten-year retroactivity provision. In
Smith & Marsh v. Northern Neck Mutual Fire Association, e2 the
Virginia Supreme Court intimated that the Virginia contracts
clause precluded the legislature from affecting the period of limita-
tions on an existing contract once the right to plead it had ac-
crued. 163 This interpretation of the contracts clause is bolstered by
the settled rule of law that a contract impliedly includes the provi-
sions of statutes in force when the contract is made.e If a written
contract impliedly includes the provisions of the five-year statute
of limitations on contract claims,165 the Commonwealth's attempt
to change this impliedly-included provision through the ten-year
retroactivity provision would be an impairment of a contractual
obligation in violation of the Virginia Constitution.
A close look at Kesterson also supports the conclusion that the
vesting rule limits the ten-year retroactivity provision when vesting
occurred before the Act's effective date, as another look at the un-
claimed wages hypothetical demonstrates. Under the Kesterson
rule, and in the absence of the ten-year retroactivity provision, the
hypothetical employee in 1986 could not recover the wages he for-
got to claim in 1952 because his employer would have acquired a
vested right on January 1, 1957 "to set up the bar of the statute of
limitations as a defence" 6 to the employee's claim. The
Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1944), and therefore that the retrospective repeal of a statute
of limitations is not a deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 311-12.
161. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11, cl. 2.
162. 112 Va. 192, 70 S.E. 482 (1911).
163. The court noted: "It is generally conceded that ... the legislature may shorten or
lengthen the period of limitation at any time before the bar has become complete." Id. at
199, 70 S.E. at 485 (quoting H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LmATION OF ACTIONS AT LAW
AND EQUITY 42 (3d ed. 1901) (emphasis added)).
164. See Hawes & Co. v. Win. R. Trigg Co., 110 Va. 165, 190, 65 S.E. 538, 548 (1909)
(quoting with approval Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 550 (1866)
(erroneously cited in opinion as "United States v. Quincey")), modified on other grounds
sub noma. United States v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452 (1910).
165. VA. CODE § 8.01-246(2) (1984); see supra note 135 and accompanying text.
166. Kesterson, 101 Va. at 743, 45 S.E. at 289; see supra note 133.
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Commonwealth likewise could not recover the wages under the
Virginia Act because the Commonwealth's right to the property is
no greater than the employee's right.17 The employer thus can as-
sert its vested limitations defense to defeat the Commonwealth's
claim as well as the employee's claim. The ten-year retroactivity
provision purports to change this result by imposing upon the em-
ployer a duty to relinquish property, such as the employee's wages,
that the Act would have declared presumptively abandoned if it
had been effective during the ten years before January 1, 1961. les
Under Kesterson, however, the employer's vested right to assert
the limitations defense "cannot be taken away by legislation, either
by repeal of the statute without a savings clause, or by an affirma-
tive act. '169 The ten-year retroactivity provision clearly is such
such an "affirmative act," repugnant to the Kesterson rule.
Courts in other jurisdictions following the vested limitations de-
fense rule have resolved the conflict between the rule and the ret-
roactivity provision in favor of the rule, thus defeating the states'
claims. In Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Cranston, °7 0 for example, the
California Supreme Court considered whether California's un-
claimed property statute 17 ' required Douglas Aircraft to report
$17,000 in unpaid wages when claims for the wages were barred by
the statute of limitations before the California statute took effect.
Douglas Aircraft argued that the reporting requirement for the
wages violated the due process clauses of the California Constitu-
tion and the United States Constitution.17 2 The court, however,
avoided the constitutional questions. Instead, it resolved the issue
by interpreting the scope of the California statute narrowly. The
court, focusing on holders' reliance on statutes of limitations, held
that the California statute reached only debts for which the limita-
tions period had not expired before the statute's effective date. Ac-
cording to the court:
167. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
168. VA. CODE § 55-210.12(g) (Supp. 1985); see supra note 129.
169. 101 Va. at 743, 45 S.E. at 289; see supra note 133.
170. 58 Cal. 2d 462, 374 P.2d 819, 24 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1962) (en banc).
171. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §§ 1500-1527 (West - ) (amended 1968; current version at
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1500-1582 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986)).
172. 58 Cal. 2d at -, 374 P.2d at 821, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
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The keeping of records, the maintenance of reserves, and the
commitment of funds may all be affected by [a holder's] reliance
[on the statute of limitations], particularly in a well-organized
enterprise that seeks to operate efficiently. To defeat such reli-
ance does more than deprive obligors of windfalls; it deprives
them of the ability to plan intelligently with respect to stale and
apparently abandoned claims.173
Since Douglas Aircraft, courts in at least three other states have
considered this issue. The Supreme Court of Illinois struck down
retroactive application of the Illinois unclaimed property statute to
time-barred property in Country Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Knight.174 In that case, the court rested its decision both on a
vested limitations defense theory similar to Kesterson 75 and on
the rationale of Douglas Aircraft. 176 The court also asserted that
its decision would further "the policy of uniformity of law ex-
pressed in the [uniform acts]." 1  Six years later, the Supreme
Court of Alabama explicitly, and succinctly, followed Douglas Air-
craft and Country Mutual.7 8 Most recently, the Utah Supreme
Court denied retroactive effect to its unclaimed property statute
because of reservations about its constitutionality.17 9
These decisions, as well as Virginia constitutional, statutory, and
case law, all support the conclusion that the General Assembly
cannot impair holders' rights to assert statute of limitations de-
fenses that had vested before the Act took effect through the "af-
firmative act" of passing the ten-year retroactivity provision. This
conclusion not only upholds the legal principles embodied in these
decisions, but also promotes uniformity in the law of escheat and
protects holders' justifiable reliance on statutes of limitation. 8 9
173. Id. at - , 374 P.2d at 822, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
174. 40 Ill. 2d 423, 240 N.E.2d 612 (1968).
175. See id. at 428, 240 N.E.2d at 615.
176. See id. at 428-29, 240 N.E.2d at 615-16.
177. Id. at 429, 240 N.E.2d at 616.
178. Boswell v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 293 Ala. 189, _, 301 So. 2d 65, 67 (1974).
179. State ex rel. Baker v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 668 P.2d 503 (1983). A recent
opinion by the Attorney General of Tennessee came to the same conclusion. See Op. Att'y
Gen. No. 83-499 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 1983) (available Jan. 1, 1986, on LEXIS, States library,
Tenn file).
180. This conclusion does not affect the Commonwealth's ability to escheat property for
which the limitations period had not expired before the Act became effective because, for
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Contractual Limitations
A second issue, related to retroactivity, concerns contractual lim-
itations on the Commonwealth's right of recovery under the Act.
Again, the unclaimed wages hypothetical is useful to demonstrate
the problem. Suppose that the employee's written contract had
provided that any wages left unclaimed for six months became the
property of the employer. Because the Virginia Act does not de-
clare wages presumptively abandoned until they have remained
unclaimed for a year,""1 the critical question would be whether the
employer could defeat the Commonwealth's right to the property
by creating this "private escheat law."
The seminal decision concerning contractual limitations was
State v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co."s2 In that case, in an admitted
attempt to circumvent the newly-enacted New Jersey custodial es-
cheat law,18 3 Jefferson Lake amended its certificate of incorpora-
tion to provide that "every [stock] dividend ... which shall re-
main or has remained, unpaid and unclaimed for a period of three
years following the date on which it was payable . . .shall ...
revert in full ownership to, th[e] corporation. ' 18 4 In effect, the
amendment "escheated" unclaimed dividends to the corporation
this property, the holder's limitations defense would not have vested before the Act and the
retroactivity provision would have imposed a duty on the holder to report the property and
would have given the Commonwealth an interest in the property. See supra notes 135-44
and accompanying text. Because of the rule for property for which the limitations period
had expired, however, the Commonwealth will have to be content with different cutoff dates
for different types of property rather than one uniform ten-year cutoff date. For each cate-
gory of unclaimed property, the retroactive reach of the Virginia Act will have to be calcu-
lated by subtracting the applicable statute of limitations period from January 1, 1961. For
example, because of the five-year limitation for claims based on written contracts, the cutoff
date for Virginia's claims against unclaimed wages would be January 1, 1956. If a forgetful
employee left behind wages payable on January 1, 1957, the Commonwealth could escheat
the wages under its Act. See supra notes 135-44 and accompanying text. If the employee
left the wages behind on January 1, 1952, on the other hand, the Commonwealth's claim
would be barred by the employer's previously-vested statute of limitations defense.
See supra notes 145-79 and accompanying text.
181. VA. CODE § 55-210.8:2 (Supp. 1985); see supra note 145.
182. 36 N.J. 577, 178 A.2d 329, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 158 (1962).
183. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:37-29 to -50 (West 1952 & Supp. 1985).
184. 36 N.J. at -, 178 A.2d at 332. The New Jersey legislature had enacted the escheat
statute on July 13, 1951, and the corporation's board of directors had proposed the amend-
ment to the certificate of incorporation less than five months later, on December 5, 1951. 36
N.J. at - , - , 178 A.2d at 331, 332. The board had stated in a subsequent call for
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two years before the State could claim them.185 When the State
later sued to take possession of the unclaimed dividends, the cor-
poration attempted to interpose its amended certificate as a bar to
the State's claim. The State prevailed, and Jefferson Lake
appealed.118
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey characterized Jef-
ferson Lake's amendment as an attempt "in effect. . . to establish
a private escheat law.1187 The court stated that it would uphold
that "law" only if it was not "obnoxious to any applicable general
law or to public policy." ' After exhaustively analyzing analogous
case law and the policies underlying the New Jersey escheat stat-
ute,189 the court concluded that the corporation's amendment was
invalid because it was "clearly opposed to the spirit and essence of
the public custodial escheat law and to the broad public policy rep-
resented thereby."190
Other jurisdictions encountering similar contractual limitations
also have rejected them as repugnant to the public policy consider-
ations underlying escheat statutes.1 91 In addition, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws inserted lan-
guage in the 1981 uniform act intended to prevent contractual lim-
itations from barring escheat claims of adopting states. 92 In
special meeting and proxy statement that the amendment was prompted by the new escheat
statute. Id. at -, 178 A.2d at 333.
185. New Jersey could not take possession of dividends until they had remained un-
claimed for five years. Id. at _, 178 A.2d at 331.
186. See id. at - , 178 A.2d at 334.
187. Id. at -, 178 A.2d at 332.
188. Id. at -, 178 A.2d at 335.
189. See id. at - , 178 A.2d at 336-38.
190. Id. at - , 178 A.2d at 339.
191. E.g., Blue Cross of N. Cal. v. Cory, 120 Cal. App. 3d 723, 174 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1981);
People v. Marshall Field & Co., 83 III. App. 3d 811, 404 N.E.2d 368 (1980).
192. The Commissioners added the words "by contract" to the old statute. As amended,
the new statute provided:
The expiration, before or after the effective date of this Act, of any period of
time specified by contract, statute, or court order, during which a claim for
money or property can be made or during which an action or proceeding may
be commenced or enforced to obtain payment of a claim for money or to re-
cover property, does not prevent the money or property from being presumed
abandoned or affect any duty to file a report or to pay or deliver abandoned
property to the administrator as required by this Act.
1981 AcT, supra note 61, § 29(a), 8A U.L.A. at 667 (emphasis added).
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Virginia, however, the courts have not considered the contractual
limitations issue and the General Assembly did not include the
Commissioner's new language when it amended its Act to conform
with the 1981 uniform act.193 As a result, the validity of "private
escheat laws" in Virginia remains unsettled.
Virginia's rule generally allowing contracting parties to agree to
limitations periods shorter than those provided by statute9 4 seems
to support holders' ability to enforce "private escheat laws." Vir-
ginia, however, should not permit holders to circumvent its Un-
claimed Property Act in this manner. "Private escheat laws" un-
dermine the important policies underlying the Act, including the
policy of providing revenue for the benefit of the public'95 and the
policy of preserving unclaimed property for true owners.' 96 If these
contractual agreements were upheld in Virginia, property would
revert to the ownership of the holder rather than to the custody of
the Commonwealth, 9 7 and the race of diligence between the Com-
monwealth and the holder for increasingly shorter escheat peri-
ods98 would leave true owners as the ultimate losers.
The Virginia General Assembly could avoid these problems by
amending section 55-210.17 of the Act, adding the word "contract"
so that the section would void contractual, as well as statutory lim-
itations periods. The provision then would read:
The expiration of any period of time specified by contract, stat-
ute or court order, during which an action or proceeding may be
commenced or enforced to obtain payment of a claim for money
or recovery of property, shall not prevent the money or property
from being presumed abandoned property, nor affect any duty
to file a report required by this chapter or to pay or deliver
abandoned property to the State Treasurer. 199
193. See VA. CODE § 55-210.17 (1981) (not amended since enactment in 1960).
194. See Smith & Marsh v. Northern Neck Mut. Fire Ass'n, 112 Va. 192, 200, 70 S.E. 482,
485 (1911). Insurance agreements now are an exception to the general rule. See VA. CODE §
38.1-341 (1981).
195. See 1954 ACT, supra note 53, prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at 217; supra text following
note 70.
196. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
198. See Jefferson Lake, 36 N.J. at _, 178 A.2d at 338.
199. VA. CODE § 55-210.17 (1981) (italicized language added); see also supra note 192 and
accompanying text (noting insertion of similar language in 1981 uniform act).
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Passage of this amendment would help vindicate the general policy
rationales underlying the Act, as well as the Act's explicit purpose
of "mak[ing] uniform the law of those states which enact [some
version of the uniform acts]. 20 0
Holding Charges
Another issue that may cause problems in litigation under the
Virginia Act is the scope of holders' rights to deduct "holding
charges" from abandoned property. On the one hand, holders de-
serve to be reimbursed for legitimate expenses they incur in main-
taining unclaimed property. On the other hand, holders could cir-
cumvent unclaimed property statutes by demanding holding
charges high enough to eliminate the corpus of any unclaimed
property before the abandonment period expires.
The Virginia Act expressly permits holders to charge mainte-
nance fees, but it imposes various conditions on the right to collect
these fees, depending upon the nature of the property.20 1 For ex-
ample, a bank cannot charge holding fees due to dormancy or inac-
tivity, beyond the usual maintenance fees it charges against active
accounts, unless the bank: (1) had a legally enforceable contract
with the owner of the deposit allowing the additional charges; (2)
gave written notice to the owner, at the owner's last known ad-
dress, at least three months before imposing the charges; and (3)
regularly enforces agreements to impose such additional charges. 202
The Act, however, contains no provision that directly limits the
amount that a holder can charge.
200. VA. CODE § 55-210.29 (1981).
201. Compare VA. CODE § 55-210.2:1 (Supp. 1985) (permitting deduction of "lawful
charges" from property escheated under omnibus provision) and id. § 55-210.5 (permitting
"any lawful deduction" from escheated utility deposits) with id. § 55-210.3:02 (permitting
deduction of holding charges during the escheat of travelers' checks and money orders only
if a valid and enforceable written contract between the issuer and the owner of the property
permits the issuer to impose the charges, and only if the issuer regularly imposes such
charges and does not regularly reverse or otherwise cancel them with regard to such prop-
erty) and id. § 55-210.3:2 (same rule for cashier's checks and certified checks, looking to
contract between holder and owner).
202. Id. § 55-210.3:01(B). The Commissioners added these requirements to the 1981 uni-
form act to prevent financial institutions from applying service charges only to property
that a state is preparing to escheat. See 1981 ACT, supra note 61, § 6 comment, 8A U.L.A.
at 640.
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The lack of any apparent limitation on the amount a holder can
charge allows holders to circumvent the Act by contracting for ser-
vice charges when they actually render little or no service. The
facts of Boswell v. Samson Banking Co. 203 illustrate how a bank in
another jurisdiction sought to avoid an act similar to Virginia's,
and how that jurisdiction acted to prevent the avoidance. In Bos-
well, the signature card of each depositor included language pro-
viding: "It is agreed that a service charge may be made by the
bank each month for handling this account, and the amount
thereof shall be charged against this account. 20 4 The bank's gen-
eral policy was to charge three dollars per month on "active" ac-
counts, but not to charge a fee when no transactions had been re-
corded on an account for the previous two or three months. In
1958, the bank segregated these dormant accounts at the request
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Company. From that date until
April 1971, when Alabama adopted the Uniform Disposition of Un-
claimed Property Act, the bank did not assess service charges
against the segregated accounts. In July 1971, however, the bank
decided to assess a "deferred accumulative" service charge on the
dormant accounts. These deferred charges eliminated the balance
of 222 of the 248 segregated accounts, preventing the State from
escheating the proceeds of those accounts under its new statute.205
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals held that the bank could not
lawfully withhold any charges after the Alabama act had made the
property presumptively abandoned and reportable to the State. It
specifically expressed no opinion, however, regarding whether the
bank could have deducted the charges before the accounts had be-
come escheatable.2 °
Even if the Virginia courts followed Boswell, holders of un-
claimed property still could circumvent the Virginia Act. By pro-
viding contractually for holding charges on abandoned property,
holders effectively could "escheat" to themselves a large portion of
the property. As long as these contracts were made up front, so
that they complied with the requirement in Boswell that charges
203. 368 So. 2d 547 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978).
204. See id. at 549.
205. See id.
206. Id. at 551.
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be imposed before property becomes presumptively abandoned, °7
and so that they complied with the requirements of the Virginia
Act,20 8 the charges apparently would be upheld.
Courts in other jurisdictions have been hostile to such evasive
schemes209 but, unlike decisions concerning private escheat laws, 210
no court has held maintenance charges invalid per se.211 Some of
these jurisdictions, however, successfully have discouraged evasion
by imposing a "reasonableness" standard on holders. California,
for example, allows banking and financial institutions to deduct
only "reasonable service charges which may lawfully be withheld
and which do not (where made in this state) exceed those set forth
in schedules filed. . . from time to time with the State Control-
ler. '21 2 Holding fees on deposits with these institutions that es-
cheat to the State, beyond these "reasonable service charges," ex-
plicitly are prohibited.21 3
The General Assembly could avoid circumvention of the Virginia
Act by adopting a similar standard. A reasonableness standard
would permit holders who actually incur costs in maintaining un-
claimed property to recover those costs, but it also would prevent
overreaching by holders bent on retaining escheatable property.
The reasonableness standard should not be limited to banking and
financial organizations, as it is in California, because the rationale
for the standard applies equally to all holders who might incur
costs in maintaining unclaimed property. The standard should ex-
tend to all holders desiring to offset their costs by charging a hold-
ing fee.
207. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Cory v. Golden State Bank, 95 Cal. App. 3d 360, 157 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1979)
(holding charge on money orders not cashed within one year struck down because contrac-
tual provision too inconspicuous); see also Travelers Express. Co. v. Cory, 664 F.2d 763 (9th
Cir. 1981) (report including service charge on unclaimed property that wiped out 78% of all
accounts held improper).
210. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 209.
212. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1513(a) (West Supp. 1986) (banking organizations); id.
§ 1513(b) (financial institutions).
213. See id. § 1522 (West 1982) (prohibiting holding fees of any kind "unless specifically
permitted by this chapter").
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CONCLUSION
Virginia's current unclaimed property law generally follows the
common law doctrine with regard to tangible personalty, giving
ownership to the first person to take physical possession, except
for statutory provisions governing abandoned motor vehicles, prop-
erty abandoned in safe deposit boxes, unclaimed property volunta-
rily reported to the Commonwealth, and unclaimed property held
in the ordinary course of business. With regard to intangible prop-
erty, Virginia has joined thirty-five other jurisdictions in adopting
a version of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.
This Act gives the Commonwealth, after a specified dormancy or
"abandonment" period, a right to possess abandoned property cov-
ered by the Act until the owner appears to claim it. Recent amend-
ments designed to strengthen enforcement under the Act are likely
to cause increased litigation, in which several problems in the cur-
rent Act may arise.
The ten-year retroactivity provision of the Act, for example, may
cause significant problems if the Commonwealth attempts to es-
cheat property for which the statute of limitations had run before
the Act became effective. When finally confronted with the issue,
the Virginia courts should refuse to permit the Commonwealth to
apply the Act retroactively to reach such property. The General
Assembly could avoid two other potential problems, involving
holders' contractual impositions of "private escheat" provisions
and unreasonable holding charges, by modifying the Act to pro-
hibit "private escheat" contracts and to impose a reasonableness
requirment on holding charges. Adoption of all these suggestions
would help further the goals and general purpose of the Virginia
Act by balancing the needs and interests of holders, owners, and
the Commonwealth.
K. REED MAYO
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